Should fictional narrators stop to explain basic science?

Full disclosure: I like the New Yorker. I’m always up for vocabulary-stretching escapism, even if I have to wade through irrelevant front matter (newsflash: the Goings on About Town are mostly useless to readers in the flyover states) bordered by ads for Swiss hotels, Thai resorts, and personalized jewelry.

Every once in a while, however, the New Yorker really pushes my buttons. Sometimes I think it’s little more than a venue for injokes or endless games of one-upmanship, meant to shame any poor soul using split infinitives, forgetting their Oxford commas, admitting they have not read Proust, admitting they only know what a “madeline” is because they did read Proust, or worst of all, using “their” as a convenient gender-neutral singular possessive. At such times, I feel like I’m reading a snarky newsletter issued by a self-selected collective of snooty grammar trolls who live in a bubble and worship a giant umlaut.

Here’s an example, from Lorrie Moore’s review of Richard Ford’s book, Canada. I’ve never read Ford’s books; I’ve no idea if I like his writing or not. Lorrie Moore seems both capable and clever. But I found the aside at the end of this passage from her review surprisingly nitpicky:

Opening in Montana in 1960, “Canada” is a story told by Dell Parsons, the son of a retired Air Force pilot and a schoolteacher — parents who have turned hapless bank robbers, and who are quickly apprehended and sent to jail. Dell also has a twin sister, named Berner. “Berner and I were fraternal twins — she was six minutes older — and looked nothing alike.” (Twins who are not the same sex are always fraternal, not identical: that a narrator would stop to explain this is unfortunate and a mistake, perhaps of the proofreading variety, that it would be good to no longer read in a novel.)

So: Moore is criticizing Ford (and his editor) for letting narrator Dell stop to point out that he and his twin sister are not identical twins. HEAVEN FORBID a fictional narrator should explain something so basic or obvious! OMG! WTF! UMLAUT! DIAERESIS!*

I like snark as much as the next person. But Moore’s parenthetical annoyed me — so much that I wrote this post. (I was also procrastinating).

My first harrumph: Given that Canada is written in the first person, the perspective on “obviousness” that matters is Dell’s, not Moore’s. Few fictional narrators write for the audience comprising readers of the New Yorker. That identical twins cannot have different genders — the detail so obvious or editorially redundant to Moore — may not strike Dell as obvious at all. My first hand experience in Idaho (a scenic Western state betwixt Washington and Montana) indicates that this nuance of twinship is not universally known. While teaching college anatomy and physiology there, I gained a good sense of my students’ baseline knowledge about things like identical twins (that is, not everyone got that question right on exams). Thus, I might well choose to over-clarify that the twins here are not identical, even if their gender should make that evident to a knowledgeable listener. Dell, the son of a schoolteacher, may prefer to “stop” and gently over-explain an issue he anticipates that some listeners may not understand.

My second harrumph: Dell’s statement, as presented in the review, is not necessarily redundant or unnecessary. Without more context, I can’t say that the sentence “Berner and I were fraternal twins — she was six minutes older — and looked nothing alike” is any more of a mistake than “Berner and Sophie were identical twins who looked exactly alike.” I don’t know whether Dell has explained that he’s a twin, that he’s a he, or that Berner is a she (have you ever heard the name “Berner”? I haven’t). We only have Moore’s dour verdict that this sentence is an “unfortunate mistake.”

So, I found and skimmed the beginning of Canada (easy to do on Amazon; the book’s first few chapters seemed engaging). Apparently Dell has done a fair bit of exposition prior to this statement, so I grant that it might seem redundant to an attentive reader. But without reading Moore’s review first, I doubt I’d have noticed any redundancy. The statement begins a passage about the twins’ physical and intangible dissimilarities, where it’s hardly out of place. And I can’t agree that this kind of redundancy deserves a parenthetical slapdown in a book review that is supposed to convey an overall impression of a 400+ page book. The overall impression the review gives is not of a systematically shoddy novel (Moore seems to generally like Ford’s book, as far as I can tell). So why am I reading this kind of line-by-line copyediting? In my opinion, such slapdowns strike me as indulgent mistakes, perhaps of the proofreading variety, that it would be good to no longer read in the New Yorker.

But I didn’t write this post because I thought the New Yorker needed or wanted my advice, nor even because I thought anyone needed or wanted to hear my opinions about how to write book reviews. I wrote it because I think it’s worth pointing out that this is a small but typical example of the kind of writing that leaves many Americans feeling excluded by intellectual culture. It’s one thing to use large, multisyllabic words; it’s another to suggest that writers shouldn’t accommodate readers who don’t share your repertoire of facts. Not everyone gets to the details of twinning in high school biology. And it is NOT necessarily obvious to everyone who might read Canada that boy/girl twins aren’t ever identical. I’ve already mentioned my personal experience teaching about twins. A quick perusal of mommy blogs (if I wrote for the New Yorker, I’d say mommy-blogs are “indispensible, when one wishes to colorfully advert to the quirks and charms of culture outside the umlaut-bubble”) reveals that strangers do ask mothers if boy/girl twins are “identical” (to the mothers’ vocal annoyance). And many fictional portrayals of boy/girl twins treat them as identical, other than gender — like “Twelfth Night.” I think your typical reader should be excused if they do not remember the details of monozygotic and dizygotic twins from high school biology. Perhaps my expectations are too low. But the New York Times has occasionally gone out of the way to define “fraternal” twins as nonidentical, and has noted that twins of different genders were “fraternal twins”.Moreover, it’s at least possible to have boy/girl monozygotic (identical) twins. Yes, it would be unlikely; but the world of contemporary fiction is hardly one that eschews unlikely biological conditions, particularly with respect to gender. Perhaps the most attentive reader is one who realizes that, when reading a novel recently reviewed in the New Yorker, it is efficient to suspend, or even invert, one’s actuarial assumptions.

Regardless, Moore appears unaware that the average American doesn’t enjoy a high level of scientific literacy. Perhaps she forgets that writing for the New Yorker is writing for a self-selected, highly educated audience. (It’s possible, right?) I should hope that if she realized that the reading public could, on average, use a little over-clarification, she would not object to Ford including it. Such an objection might suggest that either people ignorant of such basic facts don’t/shouldn’t read contemporary fiction, or that contemporary fiction should not be written with their perspective in mind — that is, Ford shouldn’t stoop to dumb down, or clutter up, his work.

By the end of Moore’s review, I wasn’t so sure she wanted a girl from hicksville (like me) reading Ford’s book, her review, or the New Yorker itself. Yes, I know the biology of twinning, because I happen to have a PhD. But I certainly wouldn’t remember the details, if I ever knew them in the first place, if I’d gone into another field of study. That doesn’t mean every author has to stop to explain concepts like twinning and gender. But I don’t think an author should ever feel bad about doing it, if it seems like something the narrator (especially a mommy blogger!) would in fact do, just in case.

When I complain about an article (or blog post), I always have to finish it all, like vegetables: there’s always a chance the last line says “Hey! I’ve been totally tongue-in-cheek this whole time; sorry if you were too dense to catch on. UMLAUT!” So after I wrote the first half of this post, I bet myself that in the last page and a half of the review, I’d find further evidence that Moore is writing for a certain kind of reader — a reader who savors diaereses, a reader who could be trusted to draw accurate inferences from twins’ genders, a reader worthy of Ford’s book and this review. And then I read it.

This is what I found:

There is a story about John Cheever that was once told at Yaddo by a painter in residency there. She was sitting next to Cheever discussing upstate New York, and told him, “Last year, I went to Cohoes to buy shoes with Hortense.” “Oh, what a wonderful sentence,” he exclaimed. . . at which point the painter thanked her lucky stars that she wasn’t a writer, since she had no idea what was remotely lovely about the sentence. . .

Richard Ford’s “Canada” may be a similar experience, though his focus is on a different America from Cheever’s, and his lyricism is the reverse of, say, Nabokov’s tight, pebble-hearted poetry. . . A certain musicality and alertness is required of [Ford's] reader; one has to hear it instinctively and rhythmically.

Okay.

Look, I get it. I’d invoke Seamus Heaney, not Cheever, but I get the point about musicality, and I get that sometimes a writer wants to root around in her word-hoard and construct a mosaic of anecdote or allusion. Stopping to explain what Yaddo is, who Cheever is, how to pronounce “Cohoes” so its juxtaposition with “shoes” can be appreciated — these concessions would break Moore’s rhythm.** At least she holds true to the principle she applies to Ford’s work: let your less-informed readers flounder (or let them use Google!) But I can’t help feeling that Moore, by resorting to a tribish string-cite intelligible only to a highly selected readership, and deliberately eschewing any explanation, means to remind Ford, and reassure the New Yorker faithful, that only that readership matters. Which seems rather “pebble-hearted” to me (and not in a good way).

*I was charmed by Mary Norris’ tongue-in-cheek explanation of the magazine’s adherence to the umlaut-doppleganger, the diaeresis, although I can’t say the same for the diaeresis itself.

**I’m aware of Yaddo and Cheever (I probably only know Yaddo from the New Yorker), but I didn’t know how to pronounce “Cohoes.” You are free to judge me for this, but only if you can also pronounce “Spokane” and “Puyallup” correctly.

Posted in Biology, Book reviews, Science in culture & policy | Comments Off

Murmurations are so hot right now

Murmurations are so hot right now, they’re showing up in federal economic working papers. Which is probably more than you can say for steampunk.

More links on the ever-fascinating murmuration phenomenon:

Pop culture: How hot were murmurations in, say, 1936? (ask Google n-grams)
Article: “A Darwinian Dance” by Grainger Hunt
Science: Current Biology short review on murmurations
Eyecandy: photos and videos of murmurations

Posted in Ephemera, Science, Science in culture & policy | Comments Off

A Murmuration of Cheese Balls: when nature enters the Uncanny Valley

Murmuration, in addition to being a perfectly lovely word, also captures one of the most wonderful phenomena one can encounter in nature. Behold, one of the loveliest viral videos of recent years:

Did you get goosebumps?

Thomas Jackson’s series “Emergent Behavior,” with its clever, irreverent portrayals of flocking behavior, both evokes and pokes fun at the majesty of the murmuration. Jackson’s swarms of quotidian, inanimate objects, like Post-it notes and Solo cups, gather for inscrutable purposes: a cloud of glowsticks on a beach (is it glowstick mating season?), or Post-its suspended like fireflies in a thin band just above the summer grass, or the colony of cheese balls below, perhaps in search of a new hive:


Emergent Behavior: Cheese Balls,
Thomas Jackson

Jackson’s patterns are evocative of natural, biological phenomena; placed in a natural setting, they seem both eerie and humorous. Jackson says he intends to “tap into the fear and fascination” evoked by murmurations and other self-organizing biological phenomena. It’s an interesting turn of phrase: we are fascinated by these phenomena, but do we “fear” them? Does the transmutation of individual starlings into a wooshing thunderhead on fast-forward actually terrify us?

No doubt Alfred Hitchcock would have something interesting to say on this topic. For me, The Birds‘ creepiest scenes are not those featuring attacking flocks, but rather those in which lone sentinel birds eye the protagonists, or smash themselves inexplicably on a door. Perhaps Hitchcock’s ragged, marionnette-like flocks — mere shadows of real murmurations — were simply too unconvincing to scare. (It may be high time for The Birds to be remade, using biophysical flock-modeling algorithms — but please, let it be by someone other than M. Night Shyamalan).

But special effects aside, the “fear” evoked by a murmuration of the type in the video above is more dignified and deep than popcorn-munching, shrieking B-movie terror. It’s an emotion inflected with awe. It’s the fear in “God-fearing”: fear intermingled with reverence. Consider the first two OED definitions of the noun “awe,” and see if their language isn’t apt:

1. Immediate and active fear; terror, dread. Obs.
2. From its use in reference to the Divine Being this passes gradually into: Dread mingled with veneration, reverential or respectful fear; the attitude of a mind subdued to profound reverence in the presence of supreme authority, moral greatness or sublimity, or mysterious sacredness.

When I’m lucky enough to witness dramatic natural phenomena (or even something as quotidian as an undiluted, infinitely deep, mountain night sky – c.f. Hungry Hyaena, on the Hubble telescope), I’m struck by an overwhelming sense of immensity, mystery, and awe-fulness. (Unfortunately, I thought The Happening was not awe-ful, but awful. There’s a big difference.) Awe manifests in chills and goosebumps — but I’m rarely afraid for my physical safety. To the contrary, murmurations, starry skies, and similar phenomena tend to make us less conscious of our bodies, blurring scale and time, reminding us how insignificant we are: an effect viewed by many as profoundly spiritual and sublime. Christopher Reiger at Hungry Hyaena, who writes often on the intersection of nature, art, and spirituality, says succinctly “the incomprehensible grandeur of the cosmos is intoxicating.”

Setting aside debates over the precise meaning of “fear” vs “awe,” Jackson is right that we have a visceral response to murmurations, swarms, and other self-organizing activity. One might say we see such phenomena as “uncanny” or unnatural — even though they are some of the most purely natural phenomena we encounter in an increasingly urban world. I think Jackson’s cheese ball swarm, or his Post-it murmuration, is intriguing because witnessing artificial objects self-organizing in an apparently purposeful, biological manner is not necessarily weirder than seeing starlings or slime molds do so. It struck me as somehow less weird, in a way: if I came upon a glowing, hovering cloud of Post-it Notes in a forest, that would be profoundly bizarre, but I wouldn’t be awestruck — I’d assume human agency was at work, and start looking for the Banksy wanna-be with an engineering degree. But when I come upon a cloud of fireflies, I still get goosebumps. The difference is visceral, not logical.

This brings me to the Uncanny Valley, that oft-cited brainchild of Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori (I always want to type “Memento Mori”). Decades ago, Mori theorized that

a person’s response to a humanlike robot would abruptly shift from empathy to revulsion as it approached, but failed to attain, a lifelike appearance. This descent into eeriness is known as the uncanny valley. (from the preface to a translation of Mori’s original article).

The Uncanny Valley effect/hypothesis got little traction forty years ago, but in the past few years it’s become nearly ubiquitous, especially in discussions of digital effects (“Critics were quick to point out the eerie look of the characters in ‘Polar Express.’”). Apparently nonhuman primates experience it too, though there’s no consensus yet on why the effect would be evolutionarily adaptive; some critics dismiss the whole thing as “an unsupported theory that has morphed into a nerdy breed of urban legend.” But unsurprisingly, that doesn’t stop mainstream media from citing the Uncanny Valley as a universal explanatory framework, for everything from scary clowns to Mitt Romney (how can he “inexplicably turn voters off despite looking like the textbook image of an American president”?).

Because the Uncanny Valley concept is thrown around so loosely, I didn’t realize until recently reading a translation of Mori’s original article, that his assessment of how “lifelike” a robot was (and therefore how uncanny it would seem) was largely focused on movement — specifically, our innate affinity for human-like movement:

Movement is fundamental to animals—including human beings—and thus to robots as well. Its presence changes the shape of the uncanny valley graph . . . because of a variation in movement, something that has come to appear very close to human—like a robot, puppet, or prosthetic hand—could easily tumble down into the uncanny valley.

It’s not just about whether an airbrushed Mitt Romney has pores on his skin, or whether a virtual character’s hair has been rendered with lifelike, elastic springiness. A robot that looks human, yet moves in an inhuman way, should be extraordinarily creepy: like a person possessed, or like the skittering, jerky ghosts in Japanese horror films.

It seems plausible that we think of the most familiar animals, the ones we tend to anthropomorphize, as within a sort of “curtilage of humanness.” This would include dogs, cats, and common birds: we’re familiar with them from young ages and have certain expectations of them. Birds are expected to be skittish, bright-eyed bundles of feathers. When birds instead begin to act like gears in an amorphous machine rehearsing the choreography of physics or mathematics, they slip along the slope of their own Uncanny Valley. Rather than automatons moving in a creepily humanlike way, they’re animals moving in a creepily inhuman way. Richard Barnes’ photographs of murmurations are strikingly beautiful, but are they uncanny, in the way the video above is? I don’t think so. It’s the unpredictable, mathematical movement of the murmuration that’s eeriest to me. And it’s eerie because I can’t grok how or why birds are able to move like that.

I don’t mean to suggest that a murmuration is inherently mechanical or robotic. Not at all; I probably think of it that way only because science fiction is my readiest referent for the synchronous, instantaneous coordination of individuals into a unified “superorganism” (murmurations as Transformers, and/or Borg, perhaps?). The preternatural speed with which birds orient themselves is certainly closer to a precision machine than a human’s sludgy reflexes, but one could alternatively describe the movement as insectoid: like the rippling, invisible motion of a centipede’s long legs, or the lightning zig-zags of a spider fleeing across the wall. (The spider-like movements of ghosts in modern Japanese horror films are a very effective, very insectoid use of the Uncanny Valley).

My point is that whatever we choose as an analogy – artificial or natural – the movement is unlike human movement. It’s strange to think of a familiar, nonthreatening domestic animal like a bird (especially a ubiquitous urban pest like the starling) acting like that. We relate to birds,* and we don’t fear them, which is why it’s freaky when birds go all Hitchcock on us. But while it’s creepy when birds act as if they are possessed by malevolent anthropomorphic spirits, it may be even more creepy when they’re not being anthropomorphic — because then we lose our tenuous affinity with them. A common starling is awfully messy and awfully predictable. A murmuration is an awe-fully inscrutable natural force.

I poked around briefly online to see if anyone was writing about the Uncanny Valley as applied to bio-organizational behavior, but the only discussion I found was in a blog post by John Robb, who argues that unmanned “drone swarms . . . creep most people out. It feels unnatural. Evil.” Robb’s take on the emotional impact of a drone swarm is likely inflected by his feelings about drone use in war and surveillance (I’d never call a swarm of quadrotors that look so much like multicolored Lego helicopters innately creepy or “evil”). But Robb’s point is that the drones’ self-evident creepiness is provoked not by the likeness to human movement (as with the Uncanny Valley), but rather by their likeness to animal movement (arguing for a sort of expanded Uncanny Ecosystem, perhaps?). I don’t agree, because as a few of his commenters point out, we do find the natural motion of many animals to be creepy (snakes, spiders, etc.). I don’t think it’s about what’s natural, but about the scope of the human comfort zone.

Mori proposed, back in the day, that the Uncanny Valley effect could be

a form of instinct that protects us from proximal, rather than distal, sources of danger. Proximal sources of danger are corpses, members of different species, and other entities we can closely approach. Distal sources of danger include windstorms and floods.

In other words, the Uncanny Valley may be all about healthy, self-preserving fear. Perhaps it was originally fear of dangerous species or human corpses; perhaps it makes perfect sense that today if that fear is provoked by our own feats of engineering (surveillance drones, robots) or by natural phenomena that — given our exceedingly rare opportunities to glimpse them — seem even stranger and more distant than technology. This is speculation built on anecdata, of course — but Thomas Jackson is on to something, with his statement about “fascination and fear.” And it’s fitting that the murmuration itself is another strategy for self-preservation.

Framing the murmuration, a quintessentially natural phenomenon, as an example of the Uncanny Valley effect underscores how our relationship with nature is inevitably filtered by human experience. A robot is not uncanny because it is unnatural or artificial. We see it as uncanny because it lies outside the boundary of what we identify, and accept, as human. It is the boundary between human/inhuman, not natural/unnatural or technological/biological, that drives many of our most visceral and problematic responses. And while some may find the inhuman (or superhuman) aspects of nature most wonderful (and/or awe-ful) evidence of a deep connection with nature, we are inevitably relating to nature based on its otherness, and we feel affinity or familiarity for its wonders only on our own terms.

More:

Thomas Jackson’s “Emergent Behavior,” found via NOTCOT.

Mori’s translated article on the Uncanny Valley is here.

*I realize many people hate “messy, awful starlings” and wouldn’t say they “relate” to them at all. But a) it’s hardly apparent from a murmuration what kind of bird is involved, so I don’t think our relative affection for starlings as opposed to sparrows or chickadees is necessarily all that controlling; and b) I think the fact that starlings are so commonly vilified in anthropomorphic terms generally supports my argument. Also, I do not have an opinion on the question of whether murmurations were historically common or uncommon, prior to human intervention/urbanization; I simply don’t know enough.

Posted in Artists & Art, Biology, Ephemera, Film, Video & Music, Neuroscience, Science, Web 2.0, New Media, and Gadgets, Wonder Cabinets, Yikes! | Comments Off

BioE is so redundant right now

Steam of Consciousness by Chris Conte (updated: look! I found a moving .gif on the artist’s website! It’s at the bottom of the post).

It’s really amazing to me how mainstream anatomical art, steampunk, etc. has become in the past few years – there really is no need for BioE anymore, which is good because as you’ve noticed, I’m not updating it enough. I promise there will be posts shortly. But in the meantime, HuffPo now covers skull art. And the skull above, by Chris Conte (a BioE favorite from way back) is apparently a FUNCTIONING MODEL STEAM ENGINE. What???

I’m also impressed by the organosteampunk work of Eric Freitas, whose deconstructed sculptures look like the clock version of a sprouting potato, with Tim Burton-esque tendrils unfurling like little roots:

Eric Frietas
Mechanical #5, 2008

Via HuffPo [link sent by my friend Andrew]: “Steampunkinetics,” AFA in Soho until September 2, 2012:

An emerging art movement, a creative design solution, a community and a culture; Steampunk is part philosophy and part Victorian Industrial aesthetic. It is a re-imagining of two distinct time periods and the fanciful and functional inventions that are produced. What if the Victorian or Industrial age happened at the same time as our modern or information age – what would have been produced in inventions, innovations, art and gadgets? That is Steampunk.

“Steampunkinetics” includes works by Tanya Clarke, Chris Conte, Eric Freitas, Josh Kinsey, Pierre Matter, Chris Osborne, Steve LaRiccia, Bruce Rosenbaum, Mark Eliot Schwabe, Wayne Strattman, Gary Sullivan, Roger Wood, Dale Mathis, Alan Rorie, Doug Meyer, Thomas Truax, Thomas Willeford, Bud Scheffel and Russel Anderson.

Posted in Artists & Art, Biology, Blogs and Blogging, Medical Illustration and History, Wonder Cabinets | Comments Off

To Mac users of MS Word

Just posting this as a public service: if you are using Word on a Mac running Lion, and every time you print a document you get an annoying extra page of gobbledygook, go to the Print settings in Word’s Preferences, and uncheck “Document Properties.”

I have no idea when they changed this default, but apparently they felt the need to kill trees. (I also don’t know if it affects PC users as well).

Argh.

Posted in Department of the Drama | Comments Off

Reminder: Follow BioE on Twitter

Hope you’re having a great summer! Sorry the blog is so dead! I’m so busy right now, my brain is scrambled. (That can sometimes be a good feeling — but not so much this time.)

I have a few draft posts started, some from months ago, but for now I’m just quickly pushing any good sciart, scilaw, and sciculture links I find to Twitter, rather than blogging them. Follow at @bioephemera if you’re interested. Alternatively, follow the Self Aware Roomba, because. . . well, that should be self explanatory. :)

Happy summer!

Posted in Department of the Drama | Comments Off

A truly great comment policy

I quit having comments long ago because I barely have time to post (as the timestamp on my last few posts demonstrates) much less weed out spam and deal with trolls. But if I did have a comment policy, I’d steal this one:

Please use the comments to demonstrate your own ignorance, unfamiliarity with empirical data, ability to repeat discredited memes, and lack of respect for scientific knowledge. Also, be sure to create straw men and argue against things I have neither said nor even implied. Any irrelevancies you can mention will also be appreciated. Lastly, kindly forgo all civility in your discourse . . . you are, after all, anonymous.

Found at The Big Picture.

PS. You may also want to read Sean Carroll’s [non] comment policy for Cosmic Variance.

Posted in Blogs and Blogging, Frivolity, Web 2.0, New Media, and Gadgets | Comments Off

Trying to balance big things

Alas, I have been in this state for a few weeks – too many big things to balance. I’ll post again soon.

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off

Of Money and Science: Two Book Reviews

Paula Stephan’s observation that “not all science is created equal when it comes to funding” will not surprise any researcher who ever labored over a grant. Drugmonkey’s blog is a particularly good source of insight into how the NIH grant process works; given the importance of public funding to basic science, life science has been fortunate in receiving a disproportionate share, and arguably more than its fair share (depending on who you ask) of public money. Part of the drive to fund basic research comes out of an oft-repeated fear that the US is falling behind in the production of scientists and engineers. Yet we all know that there are not enough jobs for PhDs, insufficient funding for public universities (which then hike tuition), and PhDs have trouble transferring into jobs outside academia even as they lose interest in academic careers, especially women, who are disproportionately likely to drop out of the tenure chase. What is going wrong?

I was attracted to Paula Stephan’s book, How Economics Shapes Science, because all of these questions are at least partly about money: who gets it, for what, how it is allocated, how much a scientist can make relative to other fields. In my experience, few young scientists actually think about the financial big picture: they know that NIH and NSF and nonprofit funding organizations like HHMI are big pots of money, but they don’t necessarily know which areas get the most, or why, or how that translates into career prospects. But that’s important information for grad students and postdocs to have, not so you can go straight for the big bucks (I’m pretty sure you wouldn’t be in science, if that was your goal), but so you have a sense of what the funding prospects might be down the road when you’re seeking your first RO1, and so (especially if you are in a position to change things!) you understand the policies and structures that control science funding.

Stephan’s book is a sort of primer on all of this, and as such, likely to be quite valuable as a reference. Much of the blogospheric debate about research, education, and policy ends up decoupled from actual numbers – quite understandably, since bloggers don’t have editors and hardly have time to go looking up references. But it’s unfortunate that as a result, debates about grants and graduate programs aren’t necessarily tied to the mechanics of funding. This book may not tell you anything you don’t sense to be true already, but it offers a good grounding in the numbers that add up to national science policy, and it does so in a most accessible way.

Unfortunately, the clarity and accessibility of Stephan’s book are not shared by Philip Mirowski’s Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science, a book that boldly describes itself on its own flyleaf as “trenchantly analyzing the rise and decline in the quality and character of science in America since World War II.” Mirowski is interesting and provocative, and ultimately it is also a very good book for scientists to read. But I think his book is marred for a wide audience by two off-putting moves.

First, Mirowski’s book opens with the weirdly strained perspective of “intrepid academic researcher Viridiana Jones,” who is “strung out between the Scylla of Disneyfication of higher education and the Charybdis of Free EnronPrise in securing a patron, any patron, to support her inquiries in an era of impending financial doom.” Jones proved to be such an annoying caricature that I found it impossible to finish the first chapter of the book. I don’t think Mirowski intends Jones to be more than a fun frame for his argument; he’s not writing fiction, Jones does not narrate the book, and granted, Jones is a more creative frame than Stephan uses. (I hope my distaste for Jones doesn’t indicate I’m totally devoid of creativity at this point.) However, I personally found it annoying to be immediately confronted with a fictitious researcher, many of whose reactions were jarringly dissonant with my own, as a stand-in for my/scientists’ perspective. Harrumph.

Second, Mirowski is both trenchant and highly theoretical. I, for one, have a knee-jerk skepticism anytime a writer becomes trenchant about science, and as a result, I found it hard to appreciate that I actually agreed with many of the things Mirowski was saying, I just was having trouble piercing his tone and jargon. As an example of jargon, he (derogatorily) uses the term “neoliberal” throughout his book, but he is not using it in the political sense non-economists may first assume. A quote from a favorable review by Sheldon Krimsky may help:

The term neoliberal, which arises from the work of post–World War II economists such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and others belonging to the “Chicago school” of economics and law, has little in common with what is usually thought of as liberalism. The important tenets of neoliberalism, Mirowski says, include such propositions as the following: “The Market” is a better processor of information than the state; “politics operates as if it were a market”; “corporations can do no wrong”; “competition always prevails”; the state should be “degovernmentalized” through “privatization of education, health, science and even portions of the military”; a good way to initiate privatization is to redefine property rights; “the nation-state should be subject to discipline and limitation through international initiatives”; “the Market . . . can always provide solutions to problems seemingly caused by markets in the first place”; “there is no such thing as a ‘public good’”; “freedom” means economic freedom within the Market.

My main complaint is not that Mirowski is right or wrong about neoliberal economics; I’m not an economist, and heck if I know. But his book is not fashioned to be readily accessible to those readers who have not had a grounding in economic theory, which I assume includes many scientists like myself. I ran across his book while reading about Schumpeter, antitrust, incentives for industrial R&D, and IP law — none of which were subjects I ever considered in graduate school — and if it weren’t for those discussions I’d have been quite lost.

Mirowski does give his readers a basic overview of economic history/theory. But Mirowski’s book is not as friendly to skimming and dipping in here and there as Stephan’s, unless you have that grounding. Statements like “there were many other examples of neoliberal interventions in the ‘knowledge economy’” and “the neoliberal is content to render the average citizen ignorant” are not readily unpacked in either tone or content without linearly following Mirowski’s trenchant narrative (which is humorous since he thinks the linear model of science is off base). Anyway, I don’t mean to suggest Mirowski is an economic apologist: his first chapter is about how ineffective economists have been at explaining and theorizing science, he then criticizes science policy wonks for getting too cozy with economists, and argues that the foundations of the science funding edifice Stephan describes may not be as solid as the rhetoric of post-cold-war policy would suggest. So perhaps stack “iconoclast” on top of trenchancy. (If you like a good flamewar, this book should feel quite homey.)

A major focus of Mirowski’s book is that as a result of patents (post-Bayh-Dole), academic science has no choice except to mimic business, to the detriment of the knowledge it produces. This is a presumption I encountered repeatedly in law school, and I believe it’s flawed as a way of predicting how individual scientists act; in my experience, most scientists are far more interested in reputation and publishing and tenure as incentives than they are in the monetization of their inventions. Also, the allure and practicality of monetization varies dramatically depending on the scientific field. However, Mirowski’s critique of Big Science has merit, because any picture of academic science is plainly incomplete without considering the university tech transfer office seeking to assert patents whether or not the PI is particularly interested, or the postdoc seeking a patent because she’s realized there is no way in heck she wants to be a PI, and she’d like to spin off a startup, or the possible problems patents pose to experimentation (particularly clinical). Just this week, a geoengineering experiment was cancelled because some of the scientists involved had filed for patents on related technology. It’s getting harder and harder to separate commercial research and academic research.

I am far from qualified to say if Mirowski is right about academic science. But his critiques are cogent, he’s witty (ignoring Viridiana, he has lots of clever snarkiness in his own voice), and if you have the patience to really dig in, it is a very provocative book.

Mirowski’s book also does very different things than Stephan’s book, even though it is on some level about the same set of issues. The best aspect of Mirowski’s book may be that it lifts the curtain on a very important debate taking place largely outside academic science, in law and economics and, to some extent, in science policy. Many, many debates about how science should be funded, structured, and rewarded do not take place within the scientific community. It’s unfortunate, as scientists have much to contribute — such as what they find to be effective incentives, why they do or don’t pursue patentable research goals, whether they are hindered in their work by patents, and how they think courts ought to look at scientific testimony or intellectual property protections. So as with Stephan’s book, I think this is well worth consideration for the summer reading list — even though it’s a bit heavy for the beach.

More:
Stephan’s How Economics Shapes Science (amazon)
Mirowski’s Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science (amazon)

Posted in Biology, Book reviews, Books, Conspicuous consumption, Education, Littademia, Science, Science in culture & policy | Comments Off

Coin-operated morticians are not easy to find

Just in case you’ve always wanted a vintage coin-operated morgue diorama with clockwork morticians and mourners, you are totally in luck! Thanks, Morbid Anatomy!

Posted in Medical Illustration and History, Retrotechnology, Yikes! | Comments Off